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Introduction.
At half past two, early in the morning of Thursday, November 22nd,
1962, 250 men carrying axes, pangas and various self-made weapons left the
Mbekweni location and marched on Paarl. On the outskirts of the city the
marchers formed two groups, one destined for the prison where the intention
was to release prisoners, the other to make an attack on the police station.
Before the marchers reached Paarlfs boundaries, the police had already been
warned of their approach by a bus driver. Police patrols were sent out and
one of these encountered the marchers in PaarlTs Main Street. Having lost
the advantage of surprise, the marchers in Main Street began to throw stones
at cars, shop windows and any police vans which they came across on their
way to the police station. The police at the station were armed with sten
guns and rifles in anticipation of the attack. At ten minutes past four
between 75 and a hundred men advanced on the station throwing stones. When
the attackers came within twenty-five yards of the station they were fired
upon and two of them were immediately killed. The marchers then broke up
into smaller groups and several were arrested or shot during their retreat.
Some of the men who had taken part in the assault on Paarl police station
met up in Loop Street with the group that was marching on the prison. These
men regrouped and embarked on an attack on the inhabitants of Loop Street.
Three houses and two people in the street were attacked: a seventeen year
old girl and a young man were killed and four other people were wounded.
According to police evidence, five insurgents were killed and fourteen
were wounded. By five o clock, the Paarl uprising was over; police reinforce-
ments had arrived from Cape Town and the men from Mbekweni were in full
retreat.
This paper has two purposes. One is to provide an analysis of the
causes of the Paarl disturbance. In the literature on black South African
opposition movements, the events in Paarl are scarcely mentioned. This is
at least partly because the participants were not politically very sophis-
ticated or articulate; they are consequently difficult to write about. But
the neglect of the events in Paarl is also attributable to a bias in much
of the relevant scholarship: the emphasis of historical studies has been
on black ideological response and has tended to focus on the most fluent
articulants of black aspirations-. There is a tendancy for the history of
black South African opposition to be intellectual history and to concern
itself with the thoughts, responses and actions of an elite group (1.) The
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popular dimension of protest is ignored or subjected to vague generalisations.
However, though the Paarl events have only received cursory attention from
academic writers, they were the subject of a government-appointed commission
of inquiry. The incident after all involved a politically inspired insurrection
taking place in the heart of an important regional town and directed against
state forces.
The Snyraan Commission report,(2) reflecting as it does the official
ideological concerns of the time, has various shortcomings. The report
concludes that there were two basic factors in the unrest at Paarl. First
there were the problems stemming from inadequacies in the municipal
administration. These included: deficiencies in consultative machinery;
neglect of African affairs by the Paarl town council; the prevalence of
corruption among location officials; cultural problems of 'modernisation*
among the migrant community and the lack of any sympathetic guidance in a
'strange urban setting'; division of responsibilty between the municipal
and South African police forces; the mistreatment of the location's
population by the municipal police. Most of the popular resentment in Paarl,
claimed Snyman, was against municipal as opposed to state agencies. This
situation,Snyman argued, provided a fertile environment for the spread of
influence of the Poqo movement. Snyman declared that there was a direct
correlation in meaning between the titles Poqo and Pan Africanist Congress:
both, were names for the same organisation. In the report Poqo is viewed as
part of a national conspiracy also involving 'communists' and 'white liberals'.
Snyman placed great emphasis on the atavistic, coercive and irrational
characteristics of the organisation in its local context. The motivation
of many Poqo activists, it is alleged, can be traced to their individual
ambitions: they were men of little traditional status who in consequence
repudiated and challenged traditional political hierarchies. Snyman went
on to argue that actions directed against 'bantu people1 (and their chiefs)
formed a more important part of Poqo activities than 'crimes directed against
the state or whites'.
Snyman, therefore portrayed Poqo as a fairly elaborate conspiracy,
through which local conditions were exploited to further the purpose of,
on the one hand, people whose personal political ambitions were not being
promoted by the Bantustan structure, and on the other, a national political
strategy devised by the Pan Africanist Congress leadership in Maseru and
their allies, the white liberals and communists. The conditions Poqo sought
to exploit were ones that were fairly easy to remedy with reforms, that in
any case coincided with requirements of government ideology. What was needed
was more centralised administration with a policy for:
,'....the regulating of the influx of the Bantu people from their
homelands into the industrial areas and the concomitant social
difficulties to which it gives rise.' (3)
Social difficulties which would include:
'....In the circumstances some resistance from the Urban Bantu...
It requires special effort to persuade them that these schemes
are not intended to be oppressive but are based on social and
economic needs; and that it is for the good of all that a mode
of living must be evolved whereby all sections of the people
can live in harmony and prosperity. The men to administer such
a policy must be specially trained for the work.' (4)
On formulating these conclusions Snyman chose to disregard evidence
submitted to the South African Institute of Race Relations. Their counsel
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argued that first and foremost , dissatisfaction at Paarl derived from the
migrant labour system and the way of life that evolved from it, as well as
the threat to remove Africans from the Western Cape altogether. These basic
causes of insecurity were aggravated by a particularly harsh and corrupt
local administration. As far as the political movement was concerned, the
majority of Poqo members did not have to be coerced int<i membership but
joined voluntarily. (5)
Much of what is to follow will bear out the SAIRR's analysis. However,
a detailed study of the Paarl riots has an additional function to that of
offering an alternative interpretation to that provided by a fairly tendentious
government document. This brings us to the second purpose of this paper.
This is to make a modest empirical contribution to a current debate on the
sociology of liberation. In a recent article by Archie Mafeje, political
responses of migrant workers are explained with reference to the partial
nature of their proletarianisation:
f
.... it may be pointed out that the fact that the families of
migrants are back in the countryside, does create an important
structural predisposition. When confronted with a situation
such as Soweto, the first thing that migrants think of are
their families back at home and their hopes materially. There-
fore the decision to strike does not come easily to them. It
is even worse when we call to mind that in accordance with
their traditions every decision is an outcome of long and tedious
deliberations by all concerned. This is a far way cry from the
instantaneous and precipitous reactions of urban youth.1 (6)
The stereotyped view of migrant workers as a politically apathetic and
conservative force has been an influential one among historians of South
African protest. For example, in Karis, Carter and Gerhart's From Protest
to Challenge it is asserted that most Poqo members in the Western Cape were
drawn from the young unemployed sons of African middle class and working
class families that had lived in urban centres from the 1920fs. Poqo
activists, apparently, had tremendous difficulty in mobilising migrant
'countrymen1, who resenting being 'terrorized1 used to report Poqo organisers
to the police (7). Just where this information is derived from is not clear,
hut the overwhelming weight of evidence suggests a very different situation.
For example if one looks at the careers of the thirty two men convicted of
plotting an uprising while working at the Jewish Old Age Home in Cape Town
in 1963 one sees that their ages varied between 21 and 63 but that most
were in their thirties, that over half the accused were married with their
dependents living in the Transkei and that with four exceptions all had
been born in the Transkei, mainly in the Tsolo district. The majority had
first come to work in Cape Town during the 1950's (8). Or, to take another
major Poqo trial, there was the group in Langa who took part in an attempt
to assassinate Chief Kaiser Matanzima: most of the twenty men lived in the
Langa single men's accomodation and had families in the Transkei (9).
Detailed local case studies of the activities and social context of
political movements help to correct mechanistic assumptions about the
political behaviour of certain social groups. They also help to show us
how ideological formulations are interpreted at a popular level. The
historiography of African nationalism has tended to be the study of
intellectual traditions with little effort made to examine the ways in
which political ideas are understood at the social base of a political
movement. For these reasons a study of the revolt of the men from the
hostels at Mbekweni seems worth while.
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Part I
The uprising apart, Paarl during the late 195Ofs and early 1960's,
had a turbulent history. There were four important previous occasions when
black resentment of authority crystallized into open confrontation. In mid-
1959 there was a demonstration in Paarl against the issue of women's
passes which apparently had the effect of delaying the local application
of the law which required all African female employees to hold passes(10).
A few months later, in November 1959, rioting broke out in the suburb of
Huguenot. Thousands of people, both African and Coloured, stoned cars,
burnt and damaged shops and attacked Whites. One person died in the riot.
The- crowds were reacting to a Government banning order which had been •
imposed on Elizabeth Mafeking, a Paarl resident and the president of the
African Food and Canning Workers Union. These disturbances were followed
a month later by tension in Mbekweni location: on several occasions municipal
police were attacked during early morning searches for illegal visitors and
an unsuccessful-attempt was made to set on fire the location's administrative
offices (II). The following year, Paarl was one of the few urban centres
in which there was a response to the Pan Africanist Congress's anti-pass
campaign. Passes were destroyed and a school in the Mbekweni location was
burnt down (12).
Paarl was not a very large town and its African population was small;
the unusual intensity of opposition to the authorities is at first sight
rather startling. For an understanding of the tensions that underlay these
recurrent confrontations a knowledge of the development and changes in the
town's economy and social structure is helpful.
Paarl lies in the heart of the Boland region, a rich agricultural
area traditionally dominated by fruit growing and viniculture. The orchards
and vineyards extend well inside the municipal boundaries to the middle of
the town. Paarl is one of the earliest centres of white settlement in
South Africa and with its population of 52.000in 1961 the main town of its
region. From the end of the second world war onwards Paarl experienced
considerable industrial expansion both in its traditional industrial •• .
sector which had developed out of local farming activities, the fruit
canning, wine and brandy and tobacco industries, and with more recent
manufacturing which had no links with local agriculture. The late 1940's
and 1950's saw the establishment of jute spinning, plastics, light
engineering, textiles and packaging concerns (13) so that by 1962 the
total labour force employed in the 102 factories in Paarl numbered 7000 (14).
Paarl1s population, according to Snyman, was composed of 17 000 whites,
30 000 coloureds and 5 000 blacks (15). Since 1950 the Black population
had undergone an important structural change. Whereas at the beginning of
the decade roughly two thousand African families had lived in and around
Paarl, during the 1950's, the number of families had been systematically
reduced, so that by 1962 Paarl's population included only four hundred
families (16) and 2 200 migrant workers, who were housed in the Mbekweni
hostels (17).
Let us look at the changing situation of African community in Paarl
a little more closely. Until the post war period the municipality had had
a negligible African population and no official arrangements had been made
for black housing. Labour in the traditional industries was seasonal and
the labour force and their families tended to squat on farm land surrounding
the town providing an additional source of income for local farmers (18).
However by 1950 the dimensions of the squatter population had begun to
disturb the municipal authorities. Paarl had been one of the last towns to
be proclaimed under the Urban Areas Act and for this reason had attracted
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a large squatter population composed of the families of farm labourers
employed in the Boland (19). The squatters were concentrated in four camps:
Huguenot, Suider Paarl, Klein Drakenstein and Dal Josephat. In 1950 with
Paarl's proclamation under the terms of the Act the Municipality assumed
control of African housing. The land the squatters occupied was destined
for industrial development (20). The authorities were to rehouse the squatter
population in two locations, both quite close to each other but over four
miles from the town. The main location was Mbekweni, constructed in 1951.
Mbekweni consisted of four blocks of barracks divided into rooms, each room
intended to house six men. Each block had separate communal kitchens and
washrooms. The blocks were furnished with beds and cement floors as well
as an entrance at each end (but no interior doors) (21). In addition to '
these 'single men's hostels1 Mbekweni had a group of small houses sufficient
to accomodate thirty families. The two thousand-odd single men paid R2 20
a month, and the family units were rented at R4 40 a month. The rents,
together with other revenue derived from the black population,paid for the
costs of constructing and financing the location (22).
Langabuya was rather a different scheme. Designated as an'emergency
camp' it was intended to house, on a temporary basis, those people who could
not be sent to the Mbekweni single quarters. Consequently, most of the
squatters were moved to Langabuya with their families. Langabuya was a 'site
and service1 scheme; in other words the municipality provided refuse
collection but little else. In the squatter camps, before their homes were
demolished*people were told tihey would be given building materials in
Langabuya. These did not appear apparently and people had to buy them (23).
But quite apart from the expense of building new homes (and inferior ones
at that) the move was to involve long term costs. Langabuya's inhabitants
had to pay Rl 00 a month ground rent: previously they had paid no rent or
had occupied very cheap houses near the coloured township in Suider Paarl.
Langabuya1s 1 200 inhabitants were going to wait a long time for proper
houses: the municipality only began to provide family accomodation for
more than a handful of people in the mid-1960's. In the meantime it was
a squalid miserable place of tin shacks exposed to the wind on the top of
a ridge. Despite this, it had certain advantages over Mbekweni for those
who lived there. In comparison to the neighbouring location it was less
easy for the municipal authorities to control and for that reason a high
proportion of those who lived there did so without permits and passes (24).
The demolition of the squatters camps proceeded in fits and starts through
the 1950's and was bitterly resented and in some cases resisted. The first
removals took place in the winter: people's houses were flattened by tractors
and the families were taken in trucks and dumped out in the open. The first
camp to be subjected to this treatment was at Dal Josephat: many people
from there were to join the African National Congress (25).
There was a special reason in Paarl why the move into municipally
owned rented accomodation from private (and sometimes free) housing would
be a recurrent source of bitterness. Much of the employment in Paarl was
seasonal:the canning factories, the wine and brandy industry, and the farms
had sharply fluctuating labour requirements throughout the year. The canning
industry, in Paarl the single largest employer of African labour, only hired
most of its workforce for a third of the year, during the summer. This
meant that its employees could be assured of a steady income only for about
four months. The rest of the time they had to rely on casual farm work.
Opportunities for this were becoming increasingly limited in the course of
the decade by the extension of the prison farm system around Paarl. In
addition, because of mechanisation, the canning seaon was becoming shorter.
Seasonal canning workers had been excluded from the Unemployment Insurance
Act in 1949. It is not surprising, therefore that many people found it very
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difficult to keep up with their rent payments. The authorities retaliated by
arranging with, employers for the arrears to be deducted from pay packets
during the peak employment period. Sometimes municipal police would
actually visit factories and arrest rent defaulters. (26)
Insecurity was not limited to economic issues. The 1950's was a
period in which the state was in a process of tightening its control over
labour mobility and implementing the first stages of a programme to expand
and elaborate the migrant labour system (27). For ideological reasons, the
Western Cape, an area in which blacks represented a relatively small
proportion of the population, was to receive the first impact of the
programme. Its effects were felt in Paarl quite early in the decade. In
1955 women whose husbands had not lived in Paarl for fifteen years (and
who therefore did not qualify for permanent residence) began to be endorsed
out and sent to the Transkei (28). Men who in the slack season registered
as unemployed were told to send their wives away and move into the Mbekweni
hostels (29). Women in Paarl»as mentioned above»did manage quite successfully
to resist the implementation of the pass laws. This was all the more
remarkable in the light of what was happening in the nearby Cape Peninsula
where the process of regulating the presence of black women was energetically
begun in 1953 (30). The existence of a strong trade union with many black
and coloured women members may have helped. However, by 1960, with the
government banning of Mrs. Mafeking, an important women's movement leader,
as well as the proscription of the Women's League along with Congress, the
battle had been lost. In 1962, the Mapheele case was to assume a considerable
local symbolic importance, as an especially heartless example of official
interference in African family life (31). The case involved the expulsion
of a young wife from Paarl who had been living for all her married life
illegally in Langabuya while her husband was compelled to stay in a hostel
at Mbekweni. Apparently quite a lot of fsingle'men of Mbekweni had their
wives living in the nearby 'temporary' camps in constant fear of official
harassment. There was also a considerable number of men who had not obtained
passes and lived an anxious existence hiding in the bushes near the banks
of the Berg river (32).
In 1962 there was an added ingredient to people's worries with the
onset of a well publicised debate concerning the total removal of Africans
from the western Cape in conformity with a Government policy that had been
first elaborated in 1955. Despite the fact that influx control in the
western Cape had been extremely stringent since that time and had been
accompanied, as we have seen, by a systematic restructuring of the African
community into a largely migrant population, this apparently was not enough.
In August, Verwoerd announced the formation of a special action committee
to stimulate employers to replace their unskilled black labourers with
coloured workers (who were at that time mainly employed in skilled capacities)
The programme was justified in economic terms with the argument that it
would encourage employers to mechanise and in so doing to raise productivity
(33). In October 1962 a concerted drive was begun in the African townships
in Cape Town to send African women to the Transkei (34). Paarl employers,
despite their political sympathies, did not favour the government policy.
They maintained that quite apart from being cheaper, African labour was
more productive and efficient than coloured labour (35). Most of the labour
force, both on the farms and in the factories, was African.
The implications of the policy were probably fairly clear to the
African community in Paarl. Employers worries would have probably filtered
down, there was plenty of press coverage to the debate, and both the
Mapheele case and the Langa and Nyanga expulsions in October 1962 would
have aroused fears. Two of the Poqo members who gave evidence to the
/Page 7
- 7 -
commission mention the.proposed removals as a-source-of general anxiety as
did other witnesses (36).
Le-t us summarise the situation as it had evolved by 1962. In Paarl
there existed a fairly small black community which within the previous
decade had experienced an exceptionally sharp decline in its economic
prosperity and social security. Black people had lost the degree of ..
independence they had enjoyed in deciding where they should live: for many
this loss represented a significant rise in the cost of living with the
move into municipal accomodation. Many families were no longer permitted
to live together. Seasonal workers were finding that their opportunities
for employment during the slack period had diminished while their economic
obligations had increased. And in 1962, with the removals debate, even
migrant labourers were confronted with the threatened prospect of being
thrown back into the pool of landless and unempolyed in the reserves. To
an extent these were factors which were common to all urban black • _
communities in South Africa. However in the Western Cape towns the effects
of overall tendencies in the development of South Africa's political
economy were magnified and exaggerated by ruling class ideological
preoccupations. And in a small community, such as Paarl1s, the structural
changes would have been especially obvious to the people experiencing them.
A major source of tension was provided by the venal behaviour of the
municipal administration. Considerable attention was paid to this in the
Snyman report. The Director of Bantu Administration at Paarl (a post
appointed by the Town Council) was a former police sergeant in the Transkei,
J.H.. le Roux. Le Roux had held the post since the inception of municipal
administration of the African population in 1950. Evidence was submitted
to the Commission which suggested that for a very long time, both le Roux,
and a black colleague, the senior clerk Wilson Ngcukana, had been using
their power- for private purposes. Accusations included the selling of
passes , endorsing out of men to create employment vacancies for which
passes could be sold, the employment of those who could not afford the going
rate of twenty rands per pass on le Roux's private farms, the enforcement
of substantial fines for trivial infringements of regulations, and various
instances of brutal behaviour by municipal employees (37). Le Roux had
actually been charged and tried for corruption in 1960: his subsequent
acquittal provoked great dissatisfaction (3^). During the trial le Roux
apparently succeeded in bribing or intimidating many of those witnesses
who were supposed to appear against him (39). People were completely
powerless to act against le Roux: it was believed that a complaint to the
authorities could easily result in the withdrawal of official permission
to live and work in the area (40). A report made during le Roux's temporary
suspension in 1960 noted an 'unprecedented degree of hostility to location
officials1 as well as an ebullient attitude among Africans in Mbekweni:
'they now regard themselves as being in a position to put whites in their
place'. The report also mentioned a massive illegal liquor trade, R4 000
outstanding rents and an ever increasing number of illegal residents (41).
What should be stressed is that the extent of corruption in the Paarl
administration was not merely the result of the individual weaknesses of
the personalities involved. Nor was it going to be remedied necessarily by
tneir substitution with the 'dedicated, kindly and human officials' from
the Department of Bantu Administration and Development as recommended by
Snyman (42). The point was that the prevalence of corruption in Paarlfs
municipal administrators, was, if not inevitable, at least made very
likely by certain structural conditions. First, the municipal control over
influx and endorsement out procedures made its officials extremely powerful
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with, regard to the employers who depended on them for the supply of most of
their unskilled labour. Consequently industrial and agricultural interests
would be unlikely to use their influence in the town council to act against
any abuses by these men. (43) Secondly, the seasonal nature of much of the
employment greatly added to the power of officialdom to regulate people's
lives and so considerably increased the opportunity for official venality.
Thirdly, the political environment, which gave tacit approval to the
harassment and disruption of the lives of Western Cape blacks, created an
ideological climate for the illicit actions of location authorities such
as Paarl's (especially when they were appointed by a staunchly Nationalist
town council).
Small as it was, the African population in Paarl had a fairly complex,
social structure. At the apex of the community were the people.wht>i, by
virtue of the nature of their employment or because of the length of
residence in the area, enjoyed a degree of status and security. The group
included black employees of the municipal administration, artisans and .3 .-'
skilled workers.From this group were drawn members of the advisory board.
Some of them inhabited the family accomodation in Mbekweni. Two members of
this group gave evidence to the Commission. Mr. Kleinbooi Sokweba, aged , j
fifty four, a father of twelve children, and a resident in Paarl since 1938*
had taken part in 1960 in a delegation to the authorities to complain about
the noisy behaviour of the inhabitants of the Mbekweni hostels (H')« Mr.
Wilson Sonyani, a carpenter and lay preacher, who lived with his family in
Mbekweni, was a member of an Advisory Board delegation which had tried to
warn the authorities of the spread of Poqofs influence in mid-1962. Sonyani
was also the Chairman of Mbekweni School Board($5)
Then there was the residual group of former squatters living in
Langabuya with families, numbering altogether about 1 200 people. Other
family, groups were scattered in various squatter camps still awaiting
demolition. The fortunes of these people would have varied very widely
according to their legal status: but all were subject to the fear that they
would no longer be permitted to live together as families in Paarl.
Thirdly there were the migrant labourers, some of whom, as we have
noted, were former squatters and who had managed to find illegal
accomodation for their wives in the emergency camp. Among the migrant
workers there were also more recent arrivals to Paarl, drawn there by the
expansion of employment in the new manufacturing industrial sector which
had developed in the 1950's. Judging by the evidence submitted to the
Snyman Commission by the Food and Canning Workers as well as the contents
of the union's reports (46') it seems sensible to conclude from the Union's
evident concern over living conditions in both the squatter's camps and the
single men's hostels, that its members, and hence workers in the 'traditional'
industrial sector were to be found among both the migrant and the 'settled'
sections of the African population. Therefore employment patterns in Paarl
did not coincide with residential divisions and the commission evidence
suggests that strong social links existed between the hostel inhabitants
and Langabuya. However there was considerable tension between the migrant
workers and the elite group described above.
Finally, there was a transient population of particularly vulnerable
people: those who had recently arrived to seek work without any official
sanction.
As we have seen black response to deteriorating conditions had on
occasions been expressed in the form of prolonged and violent riots. But
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Africans had also defended their interests through a variety of formal
organisations. The oldest of these in Paarl was the African National Congress,
a branch of which was founded towards the end of the 1920fs by two communist
activists within the Congress, Ndobe and Tonjeni (47) . This was a period
when the Communist Party had adopted a policy of close collaboration with
the ANC and its members in the Western Cape were quick to exploit the wave
of social unrest which accompanied the sharp fall in world agricultural
prices which occurred at the turn of the thirties. The ANC in Paarl was
also to pick up membership during the early 1950's as the result of _
popular anger and resistance to the squatter'removals. The fact that people
actually destroyed their passes in 1960 suggests that they were acting in
accordance with Luthuli's call for people to burn their passes, rather
than the Pan.Africanist Congress directive which told men to leave their
documents at home and surrender themselves at police stations without
them (48).
But probably more important for its political influence by 1960 was
the Food and Canning Workers Union. The FCWU was founded in 1941 with an
African and Coloured membership: the AFCWU was formed in response to the
requirements for registration under the Industrial Conciliation Act in 1947.
Paarl had been an important centre for the Union since the establishment of
a branch in 1941. The FCWU and the AFCWU during the 1950's were generally
effective in protecting and promoting the economic interests of their
members. For example, in Paarl in 1957, an increase was conceded by the
major canning employer after a brief strike organised by the union (49).
But the two unions did not merely confine themselves to economic objectives.
Both, organisations were affiliated to the South African Congress of Trades
Unions,,a member of the Congress Alliance. In conformity with other SACTU
affiliates, the canning workers unions linked the struggle for immediate
economic benefits with long term political goals. Their leading officials
often held important posts in other Congress Alliance organisations. The
benefits could be reciprocal: though the nationalist movement could draw
on union organisation to advance'political strategies, at the same time
individual unions could find their bargaining power considerably increased
by political alliances. For example in'1959 the ANC was attempting to
organise an international trade boycott. The fruit industry, especially
dependent on overseas markets was understandably fairly nervous. The FCWU
and the ANC were able to extract from the Langeberg cooperative (an
important Boland agricultural and fruit processing employer) an agreement
which included recognition of the AFCWU and a promise not to assist the
government to enforce the Urban Areas Act. In return, the Langeberg
Cooperative would be left off the boycott list (50). The Paarl branch was
the major source of income for the union's headquarters. The AFCWU branch
had about four hundred members, 200 of whom lived in the Mbekweni hostels (51),
With its willingness to take up issues not directly related to the workplace
(living conditions, rents, provision by the municipality of certain services,
etc.), the local branch of the union was an important political force in
the community.
Considerably less influential and effective, was the Bantu Advisory
Board, appointed by the municipality's Bantu Affairs Committee on the advice
of the Director, le Roux. Its members were drawn from the most privileged
members of the black population. Not surprisingly the board members had .
accomplished little in the way of improvements or even in reflecting
community grievances. As one black witness testified to the commission: *We
no longer go to the Bantu Advisory Council because it is they who push us
around1 (52).
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Having sketched in the social, economic and political environment that
Paarl's black population lived in during the early 1960's we can now turn
to the development of the Poqo movement in the area.
Part 2
In this section we will first look at the origins and development of
the Poqo movement in the Western Cape, paying attention to the nature of
organisation, ideology, strategy, social base and activity, before examining
the growth, of Poqo in Paarl its-elf.
The Western Cape, and in particular the Cape Peninsula, had been one
of the areas ofstrongest support for the Pan Africanist Congress. This I
have related elsewhere to the particularly fierce effects of influx control
in the Cape Peninsula, the 'repatriation' of women and children to the
Transkei, the refusal of the authorities to construct adequate housing, and
sharply deteriorating living conditions (52). The PAC's rhetorical militancy,
the incorporation into its ideology of themes drawn from traditions of
primary resistance., and the immediacy of its strategic objectives made.it
especially attractive to the increasingly large migrant worker population
of Cape Town. The Pan Africanists found an important section , if not the
majority, of their following in the 'bachelor zones1 of Langa (53). However
of the thirty-one PAC leaders who were subsequently put on trial in Cape
Town after the 1960 pass campaign, only seven men were from the migrant
workers1 hostels in Langa and Nyanga. Unfortunately the trial documentation
only contains full details of the backgrounds of a few of.the leaders:.they
included a herbalist, a dry cleaning examiner, a domestic servant, a -
university student, a tailor, and a farmworker and their ages ranged
from 22 to 55 (the majority of the accused were over thirty). At least seven
were former members of the ANC and one had once belonged to the Communist
Party (54). The evidence suggests a not altogether surprising social pattern:
a political movement with a large following amongst migrant workers, but
with positions of responsibility held by men with at least some education,
work skills and political experience.
During the 1960 pass campaign as well as before and after it,there
was considerable contact between the local Pan Africanist leaders and members
of the multiracial Liberal Party. This was despite frequentt-attacks on white
radicals who had been associated with the Congress movement. Local Liberals
were seeking a mass base and though wary of the racialist undertones of Pan-
Africanist ideology, they sympathised with and were attracted by the PAC's
hostility to left wing influences within the Congress movement. Cape Town
PAC leaders, whatever their private feelings about the Liberals, were glad
to accept offers of assistance that appeared to be without strings, and
allowed certain Liberals to play an important intermediary role between
them and the authorities during the 1960 troubles in Cape Town. Whereas
this relationship had certain advantages at the time, it did have the effect
of isolating the leaders from rank and file membership, as well as the large
informal following'the campaign generated (56).
In the months following the crisis of March- April 1960, this gulf
between leaders and followers was to widen and take on a factional form.
Some of the main leaders jumped bail and left the country towards the end
of 1960. This considerably weakened the degree of influence of those who
remained. Accounts by two Cape Town journalists tell of a struggle in the
Cape Town locations between 'moderates and extremists' (57). The 'extremists'
identified the 'moderates' as those PAC men who had flirted with the Liberal
Party. They were 'Katangese, the treacherous ones who are playing the same
role as Moishe Tshombe in the Congo' (58). These accounts are substantiated
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by some of the trial evidence. In the Jewish Old Age Home trial two of the
accused in their statements to the police (possibly made after they had been
tortured) mention a dispute within the PAC in Cape Town. One group was led
by two Nyanga leaders, both former members of the regional executive of the
legal PAC, Christopher Mlokoti and Abel Matross (59).Mlokoti and Matross
were the PAC men who had made the initial contact with the Liberal Party
in late 1959 (60). The other faction was allegedly led by Miami Makwetu and
Wellington Tshongayi (61). Makwetu had been branch secretary at Langa New
Flats in 1960 and was a docker (62) .Tshongayi
 a i s o belonged to the PAC in
1960 and was secretary of the Crawford Branch. He was imprisoned after the
pass campaign (63). What the evidence suggests is a struggle for dominance
of the underground movement in early 1961 between upper and lower echelon
leadership with the latter, by virtue of their stronger links with migrant
hostel dwellers, becoming ascendent.
This split in the underground movement (which was accompanied by
fighting between the different groups) (64) was followed by a period of
extensive recruitment and organisation by the dominant faction. It seems
that it was at this point that the fcell system'was established (65). Within
Langa., and elsewhere in Cape Town, recruitment and organisation was often
done by forming groups composed of men who had come from a particular rural
region. Although this flowed naturally from a situation where migrant
workers would often choose to live with friends or relatives from their
homeplace, there was an element of self consciousness in the way it was done.
For example in Langa, there was a special 'Lady Frere?group drawn from men
who lived in Zones 19,20,23 and 24 of the Langa single men's quarters (66).
This would have obvious advantages when Poqo began to extend its influence
into the Transkei (67). It also meant that Poqo cell members would not only
live in close proximity with each other, they would also probably be employed
together (68). Theoretically each cell was composed of ten men: in fact they
were often larger and in any case individual cells would combine for larger
meetings often involving over a hundred people. Similarly large groups would
sometimes accompany recruiters on their rounds (69). Each cell would have
a leader.
Langa seems to have been regarded by other Poqo groups as the local
head-quarters of the movement: certainly it was recruiting teams from Langa
who played the most active role in spreading the influence of the movement.
There are recorded instances o£ Langa activists establihing cells or
branches in different parts of Cape Town. Men living in compounds seem to
have been a favourite target for recruiting operations: the Jewish Old Age
Home trial also involved workers from a nearby hotel. Another trial, which
collapsed through lack of evidence, involved staff from the Brooklands Chest
Hospital (70). Poqo activists fanned out from Cape Town to the smaller urban
centres and the farms surrounding them, either starting new cells or
reactivating PAC branches. Considerable effort seems to have been devoted
to building cells among farmworkers: according to state witness evidence
in a trial involving a member of Tshongayi1s cell, there was an unsuccessful
meeting to^recruit people on a farm near Somerset West in February 1961 (71).
More successful in this context apparently was the establishment of a Poqo
cell on .a farm at Stellenbosch: in October 1961 after a visit by three Poqo
men from Cape Town (72).
Poqo's message was stated in simple direct terms. In December 1961 a
Leaflet in Xhosa was picked up in Nyanga. It read:
We are starting again Africans.... we die once. Africa will be
free on January 1st. The white people shall suffer, the black
people will rule. Freedom comes after bloodshed. Poqo has started
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It needs a real man. The Youth has weapons so you need not be
afraid. The PAC says this (73).
Sometimes the message was more specific: farmworkers were told that Poqo
intended to take the land away from whites and give it to Africans (74).
Men in Wellington were told that one day they must throw away their passes
and take over the houses of the whites. All who did not join Poqo would
be killed along 'with the white bosses1. Men in Paarl were told there was
no need for whites ; the factories and the industries would carry on as
usual for was it not the black people who worked in them (75)? Chiefs
should be killed for it was they who were responsible for the endorsement-
out of Africans from the Western Cape (76). Sometimes Poqo members giving
evidence would repeat some of the old PAC slogans- from Cape to Cairo,
from Morocco to Madagascar (77), but often witnesses would claim that
they knew nothing of the ANC or PAC (78). This may have been prompted by
caution on their part, but what is noticeable is that many of the
distinctive attributes of PAC speeches given at a popular level had
disappeared: there were no references to Pan Africanism, communism or
socialism and no careful clarifications of the movement's attitude with,
regard to the position of racial minorities. Ideological statements had
been boiled down to a set of slogans: fWe must stand alone in our land1
(79).; 'Freedom- to stand alone and not be suppressed by whites'(80); '
'amaAfrika Poqo'; 'Izwe Lethu' (our land). Poqo's lack of a'political
theory', the brutal simplicity of its catchphrases, the absence of any
social programme save for the destruction of the present order and its
replacement with a negative image in which white would be black, and black
would be white, all this has helped to diminish its importance in the
historiography of South African resistance movements. But because the
slogans were simple does not mean that they were banal: they evoked a
profound response from men vho had been forced off the land, whose families
were being subjected to all forms of official harassment, as well as economic
deprivation, who perceived every relationship with authority in terms of
conflict: whether at the workplace, in the compound, or in the reserve.
These were men who had no place to turn to. And hence the all-embracing
nature of the movement's preoccupations, its social exclusiveness, and
its urgency. The undertone of millinarianism, the concept of the sudden
dawning of a juster era, the moral implications of the word 'poqo'(pure)-
these are not surprising. For here was a group of men who were similtaneously
conscious both of the destruction that was being wreaked upon their old
social world, and the hopelessness of the terms being offered to them by
the new order.
The strategy of a general uprising logically developed from this
vision. The twenty one farmworkers of Stellenbosch put on trial in June
1962 were found guilty on a number of charges which included making
preparations to attack a farm manager and his family, to burn the farm
buildings and then to march to the town firing buildings on the way. For
weapons the men sharpened old car springs into pangas (81). The initiative
for this strategy was probably a local one: most of the national PAC
leadership was in prison in 1961 and early 1962 and had only fully regrouped
in Maseru in August 1962 (82). But by late 1962, judging from the evidence
of men involved in the Poqo attack at Paarl, Poqo members were conscious
of a plan for a nationally, coordinated insurrection, the directives for
which, would come from above (83). In March 1963, Potlake Leballo, the PAC's
acting president told a journalist that he was in'.toubh with-Western Cape
and other regional leaders (84). Despite this coordination of the movement
with, the surviving political hierarchy of the Pan Africanist Congress,
there is a strong case for asserting that the insurrectionary impetus came
initially from below and, as I have argued, can be directly related to the
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social situation of Poqo's local leaders and their followers.
Let us now narrow the focus and look at the history of the Poqo
movement in Paarl itself. A branch of the Pan Africanist Congress had existed
in Paarl before the organisation's banning (85). The earliest record of
revived activity by PAC members in Paarl is documentation from a trial of
three men convicted for recruiting on behalf of an illegal organisation.
All three were originally from Cofimvaba, in their twenties, and lived in
migrant workers1 hostels. Two worked in the Bakke plastics factory and one
at Rembrandt Tobacco. Their recruiting activities , which took place b-etween
February and October 1961, were concentrated in the Kbekweni and New Town
locations (86). Recruiting was a simple procedure: men would be approached,
told of Poqo, 'an organisation which stood alone' and asked to pay an
initial subscription of twenty five cents (87). State witnesses at Poqo
trials tended to emphasize a coercive aspect to recruiting: they would
claim that they were given little option but to join, for if they did not,
they were told, they would be killed or at the very least, would have to
leave the location.
However, such- people would naturally be anxious to disassociate
themselves from the organisation. One Poqo member (who did not seem to be
aware of the legal implications of turning state evidence) said he joined
because:
fL saw that a lot of people were supporting the Poqo organisation
at Mbekweni location. That's why I joined, because a lot of
people I know also joined.' (88)
Social pressure there may have been, but this does not amount to coecion.
New members veee told that the subscriptions (as well as the twenty
five cents, members paid an additional ten cents a month) (89) would be used
by the leaders in Langa 'to buy guns1 or for burials and the support of the
dependents of the dead and arrested (90). Each new member was organised into
a cell of ten people (91) the members of which would sometimes live in the
same rooms (92). Once a week the members of the cell would meet in their
cell leader's room (93). Less frequently there would be much larger meetings
involving members of several Mbekweni cells (94).According to age, the Poqo
members would also be placed either in a 'Task Force' (if they were under
twenty five) or a 'general Force'(95). The younger group would be in the
vanguard of any attack as well as performing any defensive operations.
Members of both forces would attend parades together in a plantation near
the location. Sometimes outsiders, believed to be from Langa, would join
the proceedings. Here the recruits would drill like soldiers in preparation
for the great day when they would fight for the return of their land (96).
Other preparations included the fashioning of crude weapons and, for
those who could afford it, the scarification of their foreheads as a measure
believed to ensure their invulnerability against the police. This was carried
out by one of the main leaders and he would be paid ten rands for the
operation (97).
There are no firm indications as to how many people belonged to Poqo
in Mbekweni or Paarl as a whole. At the final meeting before the attack, and
in the march on the town, witnesses1 suggest that there were about three
hundred participants. This was the figure the authorities believed at the
time to have represented the local strength of Poqo. From the backgrounds
of some of the defendants and state witnesses in one of the trials that took
place after the uprising the following generalisations can be made. These
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were fairly young men who had come to work and live in Paarl since the mid
1950*s. They were mainly employed in the new manufacturing industries, in
services or at the cigarette factory. They lived in one or other of the
migrant workers1 blocks at Mbekweni (with no noticeable concentration in any
one block). Despite testimony from witnesses to the Snyman Commission that
the leaders were 'educated men '(98) this feature does not emerge from the
records of the trial (99). From these rather sparse details a few tentative
points can be made. Poqo's local leaders were drawn from the men who formed
the most recently arrived section of Paarl1s population. The absence of any
employees from the traditional industrial activities in Paarl is interesting;
i.t would suggest that the AFCWU had succeeded in influencing the political
loyalties and the ideological outlook of its membership. Though the Poqo
men in the trial would aot have had experienced, alljthe hardships .
described in preceding sections of this paper (the removals from the squatters1
camps and the fluctuations of employment arising out of involvement in a
seasonal industry) they did come from the group which felt the severity of
the system most intensely. They were unable to have their wives and children
living nearby save illegally, they themselves were the most stringently
subjected to influx control restrictionsT and they had the most intimate
knowledge of deteriorating conditions in the reserves. It is also reasonable
to assume that the general insecurity of the community and the violent
tradition of social protest in Paarl would have contributed to their
motivation.
Before the uprising there had been at least eight instances of violence
in Paarl which were eventually attributed to Poqo. On the night of 21st
January, 1962, eleven men took part in the murder of an employee of the
municipal administration, Klaus Hosea. Hosea was believed by local Poqo
leaders to have been an informer. He was seen writing down the numbers of
lorries which had transported Poqo members from Paarl to a meeting in
Simonstown. Four of the men functioned as look-outs and seven took part in
the killing of Hosea. The murder took place between Mbekweni and Langabuya (100)
Nearly three months later on April 14th, the police were told of a plan to
burn down the houses of municipal employees and kill the inhabitants.Early
on the morning of the 15th, a strong police patrol was sent into Mbekweni.
In the middle of the location they came across a crowd of about 120 men who
were singing. On being intercepted the men attacked the police wounding
three constables and their commanding officer. According to reports at the
time, guns as well as sticks and stones were used in the attack (101). The
police were to react by raiding the location in strength on the night of
May 6th. The raid involved 162 constables led by eight officers. By now the
police were aware of the extent of Poqo's influence, but in spite of arresting
a few suspects were able to do little to check the movement: they were
unable to persuade anyone to come forward to incriminate those they had i
arrested (102). From this time police raids became increasingly frequent
in Mbekweni.
Two more suspected informers were to be killed by Poqo in the following
months and in both cases their ending was terribly brutal. Then in the middle
of June Poqo members dragged four women out of various rooms in the hostels
and took them to the nearby plantation. Three of the women were hacked to
death., one managed to survive her wounds and the attempt to set her body
alight. The day after, a pamphlet written in Xhosa was found pasted to one
of the kitchen block walls. It read:
'Here is something important to all of you. Girls must never be
present again in our single quarters, even the individual they
may be visiting will not be innocent of such charge. Never again
must any preacher be heard making a noise in our single quarters
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by preaching. One who wishes to do so must go and do it in town.
Those who are going around here with pamphlets of Wa£chtower
it must be their last week-end, going about approaching people
with, this nonsense.
People collecting washing for local laundries must cease to be
seen collecting money i_n the single quarters. We will take our
washing to the laundry-ourselves.
Christians will be allowed only, this Sunday, June 24th, after
which and until December 1963, never will any existing church
which is calculated to oppress be allowed. There will only be
one national church. All the above things will be abolished
from next week until December 1963.
You are being told. These are the last warnings of this nature.
Therefore please tell or inform each other. The time itself
tells you . It shines to each and every one, but you teach or
preach falsehood to us so that the nation must remain oppressed
forever' (403).
Then on September 22nd a white shopkeeper was killed in his shop in
Wellington. According to police evidence he was attacked by a Poqo group
from Paarl 'to show (the movement1 a) determination to kill whites1. The
group used firearms and emptied the cash drawer(104). Finally on October
28th. a witness, who was helping the police in their investigation of the
storekeeper murder, was killed in a similarly brutal fashion to previous
victims.
By the end of October, the police had arrested twenty five men whom
they believed to have been involved both in the murders and in Poqo (105).
Concern over the apparent extent of the movement's power had also affected
the Bantu Advisory Board and the location's administrators. There was a
history of antipathy between the members of the Advisory Board and the
inhabitants of the single hostels. Several of them owed their position on
the Board to the influence of le Roux's headman, Wilson Ngcukana. Board
members had acquiesced in the system of pass selling and had supported
measures taken against people who were behind in their rent payments (107).
In 1960, the Advisory Board had sent a deputation to the Mayor of Paarl to
complain about the single men's behaviour (108). This was during the period
of le Roux's suspension, when control of the location was for a period
loosened. At the weekends large numbers of women and children came into
the hostels and lively parties were held. The Board members asked for the
appointment of block supervisors, and more recently requested the erection
of a fence to prevent unauthorised entry to the location. In May, 1962, a
deputation, composed of 'leading members of the Bantu Community1 alarmed
by the recruiting and the drilling activities going on obviously quite
openly in the location, complained to the police district commandant of
'unlawful meetings' and 'unlawful visitors'. The commandant took up their
complaints with the location administration. The administration's officials
seemed to have been rather piqued that the deputation did not channel their
complaints through them and Ngcukana went so far as to compromise deputation
members by publicly warning them that Poqo was looking for the people who
had betrayed them to the police (109). At the beginning of November, the
Board asked the administration for permission to send a second deputation
to the police , but despite the urgency of the request, no more was heard
of the matter (110). Obviously the municipal officials were anxious to ..•.
maintain their power within the location and did not want to rely on external
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assistance.
However, by this time, the municipal authorities were ready to act.
Ngcukana had for some months been engaged in a series of brutal interrogations
of various suspected Poqo^  members. At least one of the Poqo witnesses at
the Snyman Commission had been in touch with the municipal ploice since
the middle of the year (111). Ngcukana had also been building up his own
client group in the location:there was talk of a group of Mpondo who had
been brought into the location recently, other members of this group .
included very young and recently arrived migrant workers who had just bought
their passes (112). On Sunday 18th November, at a meeting held at Wilson
Ngcukana?s house during the morning, the decision was taken to isolate the
Poqo members by driving them out of their hostels and forcing them to
occupy rooms in Block D of the location. The removals took place straight
away. Men from Block A (who apparently composed the major force of Ngcukana1 s
following) (113), dragged men out of their rooms, beat them up, threw their
belongings out after them, and then herded them into Block D. The municipal
police played a leading part in this operation and apparently used the ;.„
occasion to pay off a number of old scores (114). These removals did not
occur all at once but carried on until they were completed on Tuesday (115).
The municipal police then set to work on the new inmates of D Block and by
Wednesday had succeeded in discovering three men allegedly involved in the
murders which had taken place during the preceding months. These men were
handed over to the South African Police (116). With this blow, the stage
was set for the Paarl uprising.
i
Section 3
At 9 o!clock, on the evening of May 21st, the Poqo leaders called a
meeting in D Block. By now they were thoroughly alarmed and were convinced
of the need for a decisive counter attack on the authorities. The meeting
was told that they should prepare for an attack on Paarl police station and
the prison later that night with the immediate purpose of freeing the Poqo
men arrested earlier. Another object of the attack would be to obtain
weapons and ammunition for the movement. Despite Snyman's assertion that
the ultimate aim was to launch an attack on the white people of Paarl
that night, the evidence is rather confusing with regard to what was
supposed to happen when Poqo was in control of the police station and prison.
But it was stressed by the speakers,that that night was not the great night
when all Poqo groups were to launch a general insurrection throughout the
country. However, it was planned to coordinate the assault with the Poqo
cells at Langa whom, it was hoped,would launch a diversionary attack on the
police and prevent Cape Town from sending reinforcements to Paarl (118).
Three men immediately left Mbekweni in a taxi to contact the Langa people
for this purpose. While they were away, the meeting broke up and people
returned to their rooms to collect their weapons and get some sleep. The
last routine police patrol occurred during this lull and the police saw
nothing to arouse their suspicions that anything unusual was going on (119).
In Langa, there seems to have been some reluctance to fall in with
the plans, of the" Paarl group. The Langa Poqo leaders first of all suggested
that the Paarl men should merely kill Ngcukana, but this suggestion was
rejected by the visitors. Ngcukana1slept out of the location and wasn't
easily accessible,, and in any case was working hand in glove with the police.
By now things had reached a stage where the killing of a senior clerk would
not in itself provide an adequate solution. But, said the Langa men, there
were not adequate numbers of Poqo members at Paarl to launch a successful
attack on the police station.Then, Damane, the leader of the Paarl deputation,
said 'If we are dead, then we are dead' (120), and the force of this
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argument seems to have convinced the men in Langa for their visitors left
them with the assurance that the Cape Town police would have plenty to
occupy themselves with in Langa that night (121)- On their return, the
Poqo members were marshalled for another short meeting and then at half
past two, on the morning of November 22nd, the march on Paarl began.
The events of the march have been described at the beginning of this
paper and are detailed at length in the Snyman Commission Report. Just
two points about them will be made here. First, the sudden transformation
of the march from a disciplined attack on the police station and gaol into
a general attack on any whites in the path of the marchers requires comment.
The fact that Poqo members actually went into houses in Loop street to kill
their occupants suggests that this was not merely a panic stricken defensive
reaction but rather involved an extension of the objects of the attack as
it was originally conceived in the minds of the participants. Poqo members
had for months discussed and planned for a general uprising. An insurrectionist
strategy, as I have suggested earlier in this paper, arose quite spontaneously
in a situation where men were caught in a web of pressures and tensions,
in which neither the present nor the future held out any source of hope-
At the point when the marchers turned upon the inhabitants of Loop street,
the attackswhich had been primarily a defensive operation, turned into an
insurrection, and followed the lines of a preconceived model.
The second point worth making here is that, in the short term, the
march on Paarl very nearly succeeded in attaining its immediate objectives.
T£ it wasn't for the observation of the marchers by a bus driver on his
way to the location and the failure of the marchers from stopping him from
alerting the police it is quite likely that the thirty nine policemen in
the Paarl district (122) (many of whom were off duty) would not have been
able to cope with the attack. It took over three quarters of an hour for
reinforcements from Cape Town to arrive (123). The Paarl uprising still
represents the occasion which came closest the apocalyptic ideal of Poqo
and many other movements before them: a black insurrection carried into the
heart of the white cities of South Africa.
Conclusion
Both government reports and more socially compassionate liberal
analyses tend to view political violence in South Africa as the result
of psychological trauma, hence the emphases is on the apparent irrationality
of such actions, an irrationality which can only be due to ati abnormal
mental and emotional crisis in the minds of the participants. Snyman in
his report refers to the cultural problems of modernisation and the stresses
it could create:
The migrant Bantu do not understand the ways of the white man...
They are steeped in the customs and habits of their tribal life...
What the Bantu people needed in this to them strange urban
setting was a sympathetic and patient administration intent on
explaining and persuading them of the need for regulations...
The great difficulties which confront the migrant Bantu in
adapting himself to an urban life escape the mind of the average
white man. He does not realise that the Urban Bantu is in urgent
need of sympathetic guidance in adapting himself to the
circumstances of urban life... South Africa's industrial
development has thrown up tremendous and diverse problems for
it in its inter-racial relations. The easy going and generally
accepted practices of separated existences for White and Bantu
as obtaining under rural conditions have had to be revised and
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adapted to the more complicated conditions arising in urban areas...
Less sententiouslyithe SAIRR counsel pointed to.the :
...housing of men in 'single quarters1, cut off from the
stabilising influence of family life and forced to practice an
unnatural continence - which is bound to lead to mental and
emotional tensions and frustrations (125).
At a simpler level, a member of the Interdenominational African Ministers1
Fraternal testified to the Commission that the friot' was 'not political1
and caused by'the sillyness of children'.
Whilst not disregarding the social distress that provided a crucial
contributary cause of the uprising, in this paper I have attempted to
demonstrate the rationality of the events as far as the viewpoints of the
Poqo members were concerned. Just as it can be argued that the behaviour
of a rioting crowd has an implicit rationality to it, so too with the
marchers. The terrible events o£ the night of November 21st grew out of
an insurrectionary characteristic of the Poqo movement. For their members
the reversalof the present social order was the only alternative to its
perpetuation on increasingly intolerable terms (127). There was nothing
irrational nor unbalanced about their perception of the world around them.
Tom Lodge
September 1979
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